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This paper argues that it is important to take into account unfunded public pension liabilities 
as part of an assessment of the overall fiscal situation, including the fiscal positions of 
pension schemes pre and post reforms.  It examines the concept of the implicit pension debt 
(IPD) and presents estimates for 35 low and middle income countries based on a consistent 
methodology and assumptions.  The policy conclusions stress the need for standardized 
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Many public pension schemes that were installed or expanded in the post-war period are 
now maturing.  The vast majority are unfunded – that is, pension obligations exist but there 
are no assets set aside to pay them.  The present value of these promises is a liability not 
reported in standard fiscal accounts.  It places important constraints on fiscal policy by 
committing a future stream of revenues to pay off this implicit pension debt (IPD).  As 
discussed below, the magnitudes involved can be very large so it is not surprising that 
economists and policymakers are interested in grasping the size and nature of this liability.   
Most of the work to date has focused on the IPD of richer, older countries.  Yet, almost 
every developing country has at least one mandatory pension schemes that is not fully 
funded.  Among some countries, such as the former socialist bloc in Central and Eastern 
Europe, the pension debts relative to national income are extremely large and have serious 
implications for the intertemporal budget constraint.  Others are accumulating IPD at a 
rapid and probably unsustainable rate.  In fact, the situation even in young developing 
countries is alarming when weak tax collection is taken into account;  IPD relative to the tax 
base, like external debt service to export ratios, may be a better indicator of sustainability.  
Regardless of the indicator used, this paper argues that it is important to assess the scope of 
IPD in developing countries as part of the overall fiscal policy discussion.   
Growing interest in IPD reflects three interrelated developments:  First, in a globalizing 
world, governments are increasingly worried about the intertemporal balance (or lack 
thereof) of their fiscal accounts.  With globalization, governments are not easily able to 
enforce high tax rates on their economies.  At the same time, default on domestic debt 
through inflation is still possible but increasingly expensive as financial markets screen for 
fiscal sustainability and penalize unsound fiscal policy much earlier than in the past. 
Second, many countries have started to reform their pension systems, and many of these 
reforms involve a shift from an unfunded, defined benefit scheme to a multi-pillar scheme 
with a component that is fully funded.  In this process, unfunded liabilities often become 
explicit and governments want to know its size before launching such a reform. 
Finally, if part of the motivation for pension reform is fiscal sustainability, a summary 
indicator is needed to see if the reform actually improves the government’s balance sheet.  
While Generational Accounting provides such a measure, it involves too many other 
programs, many of which are not as readily subjected to an intertemporal allocation of costs 
and benefits.  To this end, the estimated IPD plus the change in the conventionally defined 
debt that is generated by a pension reform provides a provides a better performance 
indicator. 
Different definitions, assumptions, and methodologies confuse the discussion of pension 
liabilities.  For example, the actuarial deficit of a pension scheme and the accrued-to date 
liability involve different concepts.  Different assumptions are used for discounting or 
                                                 
1  Earlier versions of this paper have profited from various comments and suggestions from inside and outside 
the World Bank.  Special thanks go to Bernd Raffelhueschen (Germany) and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Chile).  
All remaining errors are our doing.  The views expressed are entirely those of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect those of the World Bank and its Board of Executive Directors.     5
indexing pensions across studies.  Last but not least, estimations entail the use of different 
models that render comparisons between countries problematic. This paper attempts to 
overcome these comparability issues.   
The next section stresses the importance of IPD in the context of public finance.  The third 
section clarifies concepts relating to IPD, while the fourth section presents estimates based 
on identical assumptions for a diverse sample of 35 countries using the World Bank’s 
“Pension Reform Options Simulation Toolkit” (PROST) computer model.  The final section 
concludes and stresses the need for standardized international reporting of the IPD 
indicator.  The Annex presents the methodological underpinnings of the estimations. 
 
II. The relevance of IPD estimates in fiscal policy 
 
Recently the concept of implicit pension debt has penetrated the public discussion in many 
countries on the basic premise that it shares some important features with the explicit, 
conventionally defined public debt, and therefore needs to be taken into account in a 
macroeconomic analysis that includes an assessment of fiscal sustainability.
2  This section 
sketches out the similarities and differences between implicit and explicit debt, the 
importance of good estimates of IPD, and the reasons why Generational Accounting cannot 
substitute for IPD estimates. 
1. Similarities and Differences between Implicit and Explicit Public Debt 
 
When establishing an unfunded (pay-as-you-go) pension scheme, mandating the payment of 
contributions to the current generation and promising to pay future pension benefits, the 
government makes commitment.  Since in essentially all cases the schemes do not set aside 
initial contributions to pay future benefits but use them to pay windfall benefits to the 
current older generations that contributed little, mature public pension schemes are typically 
unfunded.
3  While there are quite a few partially funded schemes, most have assets that cover 
only a small fraction of liabilities.  In contrast to private sector pension schemes in some 
countries (for example, the Netherlands and the United States), there are essentially no 
examples of fully funded, publicly run, defined benefit schemes.
4  Taking money 
(contributions) now with the promise to repay (benefits) in the future out of future 
contributions (taxes) makes the underlying debt akin to government borrowing.  However, 
there are differences that must be kept in mind. 
While many economists compare making unfunded pension promises to issuing government 
bonds,
5 several economists hold that this analogy has its limitations (for example, Rizzo, 
                                                 
2  Perhaps the most pressing need is felt in the European Union where an increasing number of economists 
consider it important to consider unfunded pension liabilities alongside conventional debts and deficits in the 
context of monetary union and related fiscal policy discussions.  Disney (forthcoming) argues persuasively for 
standardized measures for EU countries. 
3  There are also a number of non-contributory pension schemes for civil servants that are not based on 
earmarked revenues and so can be considered to be unfunded from the beginning. 
4  The closest example the authors are aware of is the civil service pension scheme in South Africa which has a 
reported funding ratio of over 75 percent. 
5  See for example, Hills (1984), and Kotlikoff (1986).   6
1990).  Perhaps most importantly, the creditors in a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension scheme 
do not enter into the agreement voluntarily, but rather are forced by law to participate.  A 
related difference is the fact that there is no market for trading these promises, whereas 
individuals can sell (and borrow against) their government bonds with relative ease.   
Furthermore, the return on the government bond is known (at least the nominal yield), while 
the ultimate value of a PAYG pension promise depends on a wide array of variables entering 
the defined benefit formula as well as the possibility that the government may change the 
formula itself in response to other fiscal demands.  Last but not least, the compulsory nature 
of the pay-as-you-go pension arrangement implies that there is some tax element in mature 
schemes, usually through an implicit rate of return below the market rate of interest.   
However, some of these characteristics can also be ascribed to government bonds in 
suppressed financial markets. 
Governments generally have discretion to change the pension formula and thereby partially 
default on their liabilities.  While this could create a distinction between government bonds 
and pension promises, this is a matter of degree; it may be easier to default on pension 
promises than bonds, but neither is without cost.  On the one hand, it is highly unrealistic to 
assume that the pension obligations can be avoided altogether.  There are few recorded cases 
of complete default on pension liabilities even in extreme cases.
6  Rather, the argument holds 
that usually the government finds it easier to reduce its pension liability than to default or 
restructure its official public debt.  Indeed, the frequent number of cost saving revisions to 
defined benefit formulas in public schemes over the last few decades seems to confirm this 
assertion (e.g., see Schwarz and Demirguc-Kunt, 1999, Fox and Palmer, 2001).  On the other 
hand, it is well known that governments can also default on explicit government debt – fully 
or partially through the repudiation of the principal, reduction of interests due, inflation tax, 
or changes in taxation of interests due.   
The true extent to which pension promises are more “flexible” will depend on an assessment 
of the ability of the government to reduce benefits, which in turn, will depend on the 
political and social environment.  The public’s perception of their “entitlement” to the 
payments, the ease with which they can observe the changes to often-complex benefit 
formulas, and the average age of the population are among the factors that are likely to 
determine how much room a government has to maneuver.
7  In some cases, the courts may 
even use a broad interpretation of what is protected by the Constitution with implications 
for the ability of the governments to change the rules.  Intervention by the courts to restrict 
changes that would have reduced the value of pension liabilities has already occurred in 





                                                 
6  Even in the case of war-torn Bosnia, payments continued during the war and liabilities for missed payments 
have been recorded. 
7  This is not just an academic issue.  For example, a 1996 UK Parliamentary report (Social Security Committee, 
1996) entitled “Unfunded Pension Liabilities in the European Union” questioned the extent to which the 
liabilities could be reduced in the face of industrial unrest, citing protests in Germany and France. 
8  Rizzo (1990) tests for the determinants of pension liabilities using a public choice framework.   7
2.  Reasons Why Good Estimates of IPD Are Needed 
 
While some differences between implicit and explicit debt do exist, for many purposes they 
can be classified as public debt.  Hence, knowledge about the scope and development of 
IPD is important for macroeconomic analysis and policy.  In addition, good estimates of 
IPD are important for pension reform, ex-ante for its initiation and preparation, and ex-post 
for its assessment. 
 
Macroeconomic analysis and policy.  There are three main reasons why good estimates are needed 
for macroeconomic analysis and policy development.  First, if unfunded pension 
commitments are public sector liabilities, the question emerges as to how they influence 
individual decisions of consumption and portfolio allocation.  There is a large body of 
economic literature on macroeconomic implications of public pension systems that assumes 
that the acquisition of pension wealth through a pay-as-you-go plan may induce individuals 
to increase their lifetime consumption or lead them to try to compensate future generations 
that will have to pay off these obligations.
9  In either case, economists treat these unreported 
obligations as determinants of observed behavior.  Unless there is pension debt on the 
government’s balance sheet as a liability, pension wealth cannot exist on the individual’s 
balance sheet as an asset.
10  Furthermore, since pension assets and financial assets have 
different rates of return and these are imperfectly correlated, the size, rate of return, and 
volatility of pension wealth impact the portfolio composition of individuals.  Second, since 
unfunded pension obligations are public debt, they co-determine the intertemporal budget 
constraint of government.  Keeping the government solvent requires future tax revenue, 
partial default on its pension commitments, or future lower public expenditure elsewhere.  
Rising IPD accentuates these needs, and making good decisions about revenue and 
expenditure policy requires information about the current and future scope of the IPD.  
Third, a given path of IPD with constant policy parameters reduces the ability of 
government to service the explicit pension debt and heightens the risk of default or 
monetary bail-out (Hochreiter, Winckler, and Brandner 1998).  Financial markets are 
increasingly aware of this link and compensate with a risk premium on government debt.  
Uncertainty about the true scope of IPD in the context of globalization and mobile capital 
may increase this premium.  Again, credible estimates should prove advantageous. 
Initiating pension reform.  When reforming a pension system, estimates about the initial and 
reform-induced changes in IPD are important.  Estimates about the IPD and its future path 
under an unreformed system serve to inform the public about the need for reform.   
Estimates about the expected changes of the new IPD path serve to demonstrate the extent 
to which the reform will improve the long-run sustainability of the scheme.  Mere 
concentration on the expenditure and revenue paths of the old and new systems does not 
provide the same information (although these projections are also crucial to inform the 
debate).  This is because the reform may dramatically reduce the implicit debt, but the effects 
on expenditure and revenue paths occur only gradually.  For example, changing from wage 
to price indexation (with a real wage growth of 2 percent) has only modest initial effects on 
the fiscal balance of the scheme.  Yet, as measured by the IPD, almost half of the reduction 
(some 1/6 or 30 percent of GDP in a typical mature OECD type pension scheme) takes 
place when this measure is implemented (Holzmann, 1999).   
                                                 
9  For a review of literature see World Bank (1994) and Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven (1999). 
10  This is true for those who argue for a life-cycle consumption type behavior as well as for those who hold 
that Ricardian equivalence type behavior exists.    8
Equally important are estimates of IPD for a reform in which a shift to full or partial 
funding is envisaged.  Such a move makes the implicit debt explicit.  In many cases, the 
implicit debt is so large that the option of immediate conversion to funding is considered 
too disruptive to the fiscal accounts.  The speed of the transition depends on how quickly 
traded government bonds can replace implicit debt and what indirect costs this might place 
on the government.  This in turn depends on initial conditions with respect to conventional 
debt, including its size and risk premium at the moment of transition.  How much explicit 
debt can be allowed to emerge and in what sequence have a strong bearing on the reform 
design. 
Assessing pension reform.  When moving from unfunded to funded pensions, the full budgetary 
financing of an emerging transition deficit may not be feasible, and a partial  debt financing 
can be justified based on tax-smoothing, consumption smoothing, and inter-generational 
considerations (Holzmann, 1998).  Hence, while the reform reduces the implicit debt, this is 
partly compensated by an increase in the explicit debt.  In order to assess the financial 
success of a pension reform and make sure that it actually leads to a fall in the overall 
government obligations, joint and rolling estimates of the IPD and the reform-induced 
explicit financial debt are required.
11   
3. Generational accounts and pension reform 
 
Generational Accounting (GA) has become an important instrument for assessing the 
financial sustainability of the public sector.  Estimates already exist for most industrialized 
countries and an increasing number of developing countries (Kotlikoff and Raffelhueschen, 
1999; Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Leibfritz, 1999) and are often added to more traditional 
budget presentations.  A main indicator based on these estimates is the age profile of net-
transfer age profile, i.e., lifetime transfers minus taxes for each age cohort.  By taking into 
account the changing demographic structure, the initial explicit debt, and public 
consumption expenditures, it highlights changes in the overall net burden on different 
generations.  The impact of pension reform would be reflected in changes to the net-transfer 
profile by age cohort. 
Aside from methodological problems that may affect GA estimates, their application for the 
assessment of pension reform is subject to certain limitations due to the nature of the 
exercise (e.g., see Banks et al. 2000).  First, since GA is applied to a broad set of programs 
the methodology does not tend to consider the details of particular pension schemes.  While 
this could be remedied through more detailed analysis of this one program, a more 
fundamental problem lies in the distinction made earlier in this paper.  Contributory pension 
schemes are, more than other government expenditures, similar to repayment of loans.   
Aside from the potential indirect impact on growth, payments into and out of these systems 
can be assigned to specific generations in a way that general revenue financed programs like 
social assistance cannot.  This, in fact, is the argument for changing the accounting of 
pension liabilities in the first place as has been pointed out by some of the major proponents 
of GA (Kotlikoff, 1986). 
                                                 
11  There are few examples of this type of assessment for actual pension reforms.  One example is Beltrametti 
(1996) which looks at the impact of the Dini and Amato pension reforms on an IPD measure in Italy.   9
Another problem with GA for assessing pension reform outcomes is that by definition it 
relies on projections of revenues for the calculation of the net transfer by age.  This requires 
more heroic assumptions especially in developing countries with partial coverage of the labor 
force.  For example, most public pension schemes currently cover less than half of the labor 
force, but international patterns and the historical experience of developed countries suggest 
that coverage expands as incomes rise.  As a result, the outcome for a particular generation 
based on a GA analysis of the pension system depends heavily on the assumed path of 
coverage.  The longer the “Ponzi scheme” can be kept going by adding new contributors, 
the more positive the net transfer to current generations.  As discussed below, this is similar 
to the problems found in the net pension liability calculation and is one of the reasons that 
we choose to focus on gross IPD. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that just as different definitions of the pension liability 
provide different insights over time and across countries, GA can complement IPD 
measures and can even be applied specifically to the pension system in isolation in a useful 
way (e.g. see Yun, 2000 for Korea and Gál et al., 2001 for Hungary).   
 
III. Alternative Definitions of the Implicit Pension Debt 
 
While the concept of IPD appears intuitively simple and straightforward, in reality there are 
different definitions of IPD and methods for calculating it.  This section starts out by 
highlighting the different types of unfunded pension liabilities, including those of privately 
managed schemes.  Next, it presents alternative definitions of the scope of IPD for the 
typical defined benefit schemes.  Since there is no single accepted methodology for 
calculating the liability of public, unfunded, defined benefit schemes, the second subsection 
reviews the experience in the private sector.  The final subsection reviews existing estimates 
for pubic sector liabilities.  This sets the stage for the proposed pragmatic methodology for 
international comparisons in the fourth section of the paper. 
1. Different Types of Unfunded Pension Liabilities 
 
The last section focused on the unfunded, defined benefit-type public pension promise, 
which is the most common in the world today (Palacios and Pallares, 2000).  But there is a 
variant of this promise emerging – the notional defined contribution scheme (NDC) – and 
there are at least two other types of public pension promises that imply liabilities for the 
government and that are linked with privately provided voluntary and mandatory schemes.  
Table 1 lists the types of pension liability and examples of countries where they are relevant, 
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Table 1.  Types of Unfunded Public Pension Liabilities 
 
Source of Liability  Examples of Countries where Operative 
Guarantees for Voluntary  
Private Schemes 
United States 
Guarantees for Mandatory  
Private Schemes 
Chile, Mexico, United Kingdom, and 
Hungary 
Unfunded, Public Defined 
Benefit Schemes 
Most countries with varying degrees 
of coverage 
Unfunded, Public Notional Account 
Schemes 
Italy, Latvia, Poland, and Sweden 
 
Guarantees of privately managed defined-benefit plans take many different forms.  In the United 
States, employer-sponsored defined benefit plans pay the Pension Benefit Guarantee 
Corporation (PBGC) a premium, which serves to insure some portion of the acquired 
pension rights of covered workers if funding levels are not sufficient to cover liabilities at 
termination.  This guarantee does not extend, however, to indexation of benefits, making 
workers who depend on it highly susceptible to inflation risk. 
In the United Kingdom and Japan, the government explicitly provides a guarantee against 
inflation that protects workers who have opted to “contract-out” of the public scheme and 
enter an employer-sponsored defined benefit plan.  In the United Kingdom, this guarantee is 
triggered at inflation levels above five percent, while the Japanese government pays the 
entire cost of inflation indexation for the more than eight million workers who have 
contracted out through their employer pension funds.  The nature of government guarantees 
of defined benefit schemes in the private sector vary across countries and are not always 
explicit.  The size of the contingent liabilities associated with them depends on the funding 
rules and private pension coverage.  Coverage ranges from practically nil in many developing 
countries to very high in countries such as the Netherlands and Switzerland. 
Minimum pension guarantees of publicly mandated, privately managed defined contribution schemes were 
until recently found only in Chile, where they were designed to serve as the redistributive 
element and social safety net for the new system of privately managed pension firms known 
as Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones or AFPs.  The minimum pension guarantee 
requires that the government pay an amount equivalent to the difference between the 
accumulated balance in an individual worker’s private pension account at time of retirement 
and the amount that would provide an annuity equivalent to a pre-specified minimum 
pension.  In recent years, this minimum has hovered around 25 percent of the average wage 
in Chile for workers who fulfill the required twenty-year vesting requirement.
12   
                                                 
12  In addition to the minimum pension guarantee, the Chilean scheme guarantees the payment of pensions in 
case a life insurance company providing annuities goes bankrupt.  The guarantee covers 100 percent of the 
annuity up to the minimum pension and 75 percent of the annuity in excess of the minimum (see Chilean 
Superintendency of AFPs, 1996).  Argentina has a similar guarantee for the annuity stage of its system.   11
The Colombian scheme offers a minimum pension guarantee in its new privately managed 
tier that is quite high relative to the average covered wage.  The magnitude of the contingent 
liability associated with this type of minimum pension guarantee will be a function of several 
factors including the real rate of return achieved by the new private pension funds, the size 
distribution of covered wages, labor force participation and unemployment, evasion, and 
changes in life expectancy that affect the annuity. 
The new Mexican pension system has incorporated a complex hybrid guarantee.  It allows 
members of the scheme at the time of the reform to take the pay-as-you-go pension they 
would have received under the pre-reform pay-as-you-go scheme if it is higher than what 
they are able to generate in the new funded scheme.  Hungary has a similar guarantee for 
those with at least 15 years of contributions to the privately managed pension system.  In the 
Hungarian case, the guarantee is specified as a fraction of the residual pay-as-you-go 
pension.  This means that in both countries the liability will depend on the same factors 
associated with the minimum pension guarantees but also on other factors that determine 
the benefits in their respective pay-as-you-go schemes.  
Finally, several countries including Chile, Poland and Argentina guarantee relative rates of 
return on defined contribution accounts.  In the event that a particular pension fund 
performs substantially below the average for the other pension funds over a certain period 
of time (say, 24 months as in the case of Chile), the private provider and ultimately the 
government is required to make up part of the difference.   
Unfunded liabilities of publicly managed defined benefit plans refer to those liabilities arising from 
“social insurance” schemes that currently dominate public pension provision around the 
world.  These schemes have proliferated since they first appeared over a century ago and are 
now found in more than 150 countries.  They cover the vast majority of the labor force and 
the elderly in the industrial world.  Global labor force coverage of public pension schemes 
has been estimated at around forty percent, and most covered workers participate in 
schemes of this type.  Many countries have multiple schemes that cover specific groups of 
workers, most commonly the military and civil servants, and many of these are non-
contributory.  The liability in the case of unfunded social insurance type pension promises 
are very large, as discussed below. 
Unfunded liabilities of publicly managed defined contribution plans have emerged in the last few years.  
The “notional defined contribution” pension combines the individual accounts of a privately 
managed defined contribution scheme with pay-as-you-go financing.  This results in an 
individual worker with a government promise whose value should be almost as easy to 
monitor at any given point in time as a government bond.
13  The individual account balance 
is increased by a specified rate of return determined by the government, and the notional 
accumulation is divided by life expectancy to calculate the annual payment upon retirement.  
This rate of return has been set at the rate of growth of the covered wage bill or average 
wages, and in the case of Italy to the rate of GDP growth.  The purpose of tying it to these 
indicators is to link the growth of liabilities to the growth of projected revenues in some way.  
However, this does not guarantee sustainability.  The choice of the notional interest rate as 
well as other design features, such as minimum benefits and indexation of the calculated 
                                                 
13 This concept is in line with proposals by Buchanan (1968) and others to make the accumulating obligation 
explicit in the form of special non-tradeable bonds with a prescribed interest rate.   12
annuity, have a bearing on the fiscal sustainability and therefore on the government liability 
in view of economic and demographic shocks (Disney, 1999; Palmer, 2000; Valdes-Prieto, 
2000). 
This arrangement may reinforce the analogy with bonds in the minds of the public and may 
make the liability easier to measure and observe.  To the extent that this reduces perceived 
risk associated with the pension promise, it could increase the credibility of the scheme.  On 
the other hand, if the difference between the average rates of return in the scheme and in the 
market remains and evasion is relatively easy, it may have the opposite impact.  At the same 
time, some flexibility to reduce the obligations may be lost. 
As a final note, other types of pension promises not included in Table 1 are the universal or 
basic pensions that is provided on the basis of citizenship in New Zealand, Canada, 
Mauritius, and the Nordic countries, and the means-tested pensions in Australia.  An 
argument for reporting these liabilities based on the likelihood of having to keep these 
promises to future retirees could be made.  New Zealand has opted not to report such 
liabilities at the moment despite having moved to an accrual based accounting scheme but 
does require periodic assessments of future costs.
14 
2.  Defining the Scope of Pension Liabilities – Alternative Definitions 
 
This subsection reviews alternative definitions for pension liabilities of unfunded, defined 
benefit schemes and their link with the actuarial deficit of a pension scheme, another 
concept used in the pension policy discussion.  There are three main definitions of pension 
liabilities, that is, the stock of commitments to pension future outlays (Franco, 1995).
15 
Accrued-to-date liabilities represent the present value of pensions to be paid in the future on the 
basis of accrued rights; neither future contributions, nor the accrual of new rights on the 
basis of these contributions are considered. 
Projected liabilities of current workers and pensioners involve the assumption that pension schemes 
continue their existence until the last contributor dies, while no new entrants are allowed; 
both the future contribution of existing members and their new rights are therefore allowed 
under current rules.  This is also referred to as the closed-group method for calculating these 
liabilities. 
Open-system liabilities include the present value of contributions and pensions of new workers 
under current rules; the range of options extends from including only children not yet in the 
labor force, to an infinite perspective.  Normally, an arbitrary time period is chosen and the 
methodology is applied over that period. 
 
                                                 
14 Changes in unfunded liabilities of the public employees’ superannuation scheme are reported under the new 
accrual accounting system, however. 
15 Alternative terminology on pension liabilities taken from the US private sector context using roughly 
equivalent concepts is:  (a) accrued termination liability; (b) present value of anticipated benefit payments to 
current participants; and (c) “ongoing concern” liability.  See Section III.3.   13
 
Table 2 highlights the interrelation between the alternative definitions of pension liabilities 
and the concept of actuarial deficit, the balancing item.  The difference between the three 
main definitions of pension liabilities (gross IPD) reflects alternative views of which 
generations, and their claims, should be considered.  The difference between the gross and 
net concept results from taking account of assets (financial reserves and present value of 
future contributions); the net concept is equivalent to the balancing item, the actuarial 
deficit.  The concept of debt or wealth represents alternative views from the side of 
government (debt) or individuals (wealth).  For example, the gross IPD of the current 
generation (as seen from government) corresponds to the gross social security wealth (as 
seen from the individuals); and the net social security wealth corresponds to the actuarial 
deficit of the current generation. The concept of net/gross social security wealth was 
introduced into the pension discussion by Feldstein (1974)
 .
16 
The appropriate definition for estimating the IPD depends on the economic policy question 
to be answered.  To investigate the inter-temporal budget constraint, including the financial 
                                                 
16 In the steady state, with an actuarially balanced pension system without financial reserves, both accrued-to-
date liabilities (the gross implicit pension debt) and the net-social security wealth coincide since the present 
value of further liabilities resulting from future contributions and the present value of future contributions 
cancel out. 
Table 2.  Alternative Definitions of Pension Liabilities, Actuarial Deficits, and their Interaction
Assets Liabilities Definition of Balance Definition of Liability
Financial reserves Present value of pensions
in disbursement
Actuarial Deficit I Present value of future
pensions due to past contri-
butions of current workers
Gross Implicit Pension Debt I Gross Implicit Pension Debt I Actuarial Deficit I = Accrued to Date
Net-Implicit Pension Debt I Liability
Present value of future Present value of future
contributions of current pensions due to future
workers contributions of current
workers
Actuarial Deficit II
Gross Implicit Pension Debt IIGross Implicit Pension Debt II
Gross Implicit Pension Debt Gross Implicit Pension Debt Actuarial Deficit I+II = Projected current Workers
of Current Generation of Current Generation Net Implicit Pension Debt II and Pensioner's Liability
Present value of contributions Present value of pensions
of future generations due to contributions of
future generations
Actuarial Deficit III
Gross Implicit Pension Debt Gross Implicit Pension Debt
of Future Generation of Future Generation
Gross Implicit Pension Debt Gross Implicit Pension Debt Actuarial Deficit I+II+III = Open System
of all Generations of all Generations Total Actuarial Deficit Liability
i.e. total net-IPD
Source: Adapted from Holzmann(1998)  14
sustainability of a pension scheme, definition 3 appears to be the most appropriate.  To 
investigate a move from unfunded to funded provisions, it is the first definition that is 
relevant, since it is the value of accrued rights that may have to be  liquidated and, to the 
extent that this is financed through higher deficits, become explicit debt.  For a given 
pension system, the main economic assumptions that determine the level of the accrued 
pension liabilities are the differential between the discount rate and the assumed indexation 
parameter (wage growth, inflation or other) and survival probabilities.  For countries where 
the public pension system has accumulated financial reserves, the existing assets are 
subtracted. 
3. Measuring Defined Benefit Liabilities in the Private Sector 
 
Defined benefit liabilities are regularly calculated in countries with funded private pension 
schemes where the information is necessary in order to comply with tax rules as well as to 
meet the standards for minimum funding imposed by regulators, and these requirements are 
often not equivalent.  In addition, there is likely to be some incentive for companies to know 
their own funding status, and shareholders may demand to have an accurate and thorough 
accounting of these liabilities.  Finally, the need to assess the value of individual worker 
benefits may arise if workers demand to know what pension rights they have accrued or if 
they move to another company and are allowed to take their accrued benefits with them.  
This subsection briefly reviews approaches, issues, and experiences in measuring private-
sector defined benefit pension liabilities in selected countries. 
An example of the legal incentives to calculate such liabilities is found in the complex 1974 
US legislation known as the Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act (ERISA).  ERISA 
set minimum and maximum funding ratios along with rules about how to pay off the 
liabilities of terminated plans.  The minimum funding requirements are intended to protect 
the taxpayer from abuse of PBGC insurance while the maximum limit reduces possible tax 
expenditures that could arise as companies “overfund” plans enjoying preferential tax 
treatment.   
In addition to funding issues, some rules are designed to inform investors.  The US Financial 
Standards Accounting Board (FASB) has, since 1989, required that the unfunded liability 
appear on firms’ balance sheets (Warshawsky, 1989).  Other reporting requirements stem 
from the need to prove that pension plans satisfy tax-exempt criteria.  This is true, for 
example, in Germany and Japan, where properly documented “book reserves” are required 
in order for schemes to qualify for favorable tax treatment.  In Japan, as much as 40 percent 
of the “book reserves” are tax deductible (Murakami, 1990). 
The private sector methods used to calculate the pension liabilities affect the way these 
liabilities are financed, or the so-called “actuarial cost methods.”  This is the umbrella term 
used in the United States to describe “the method of allocating the cost of a defined benefit 
pension plan to each year of the plan’s existence in an orderly fashion” (Archer, 1991).  
Examples of the methods available include pay-as-you-go, terminal funding (where lump-
sum contributions equivalent to the estimated present value of the annuity are made as the 
employee retires), and book reserve, where liabilities are entered as loans to the plan 
sponsor.  The pay-as-you-go method is used by occupational pension schemes in France, 
while book reserve schemes are prevalent in Japan and Germany.  The actuarial cost method   15
will influence the way the unfunded liability is financed over time but not the value of the 
liability itself. 
The different types of liability calculations will reflect the objectives of the regulators and tax 
authorities.  This is apparent in the most common methods of calculating the pension 
liability.  These can be usefully divided into three general categories. 
The “going concern” liability includes the present value of benefits already earned by current 
participants as well as the benefits future participants are expected to accrue during their 
working lives.  It is the most ambitious of the three liability estimates and clearly involves 
many assumptions about future participation in the plan over a potentially infinite time 
horizon.  This method generates a liability that can then be equated to the stream of pension 
contributions over the same period yielding the concept of actuarial balance used by some 
public pay-as-you-go schemes.
17  The underlying premise of this calculation is that these 
schemes will never be terminated. 
The present value of anticipated benefit payments to current participants is similar to the first method in 
that it includes future accrual of benefits and, implicitly or explicitly, involves assumptions 
about future earnings growth, indexation of benefits, and other variables that impact the 
stream of future benefits.  It differs in that it does not attempt to project these factors for 
new participants, who are ignored completely.  Obviously, the present value of expected 
benefit payments to current participants will be lower than the liabilities generated by the 
going concern method due to the exclusion of future participants.   
The accrued liability to current participants prorates future benefits by the years of service out of 
the potential years of service.  Minimum vesting periods may also be taken into account.  
Since full vesting and maximum accrual is achieved at the time of initial benefit award, the 
liability to the stock of current beneficiaries should be equivalent to the present value of 
anticipated future payments.  However, since the method prorates future benefits for active 
participants, the accrued benefit liability should always be smaller than the present value of 
expected benefit payments generated by the first two liability calculations mentioned above. 
Of the three concepts, the accrued liability method should yield the lowest gross pension 
liability – that is, before taking into account anticipated contribution revenues.  This category 
can be further subdivided into at least two groups.  The first, referred to here as the 
continued-accrual liability, values the accrued liability as if the scheme had continued into the 
future.  The second category, the accrued termination liability, assumes just the opposite – 
that the scheme is terminated at the time of valuation.  The main difference between the 
gross liability estimate in the two cases is that the continuation of the plan implies that future 
retirement behavior, job loss, pre-retirement mortality or disability and other factors could 
be taken into account.  In other words, as defined here, the termination liability would be 
greater than the continued accrual liability if, as would normally be the case, the latter 
includes assumptions that would reduce the number of fully vested, full career workers. 
Another important question is whether the method chosen takes into account projected 
wage increases.  In the case of the accumulated benefit obligation, or ABO as it is known in 
the US context, future salary increases are ignored.  Another version of the accrued liability 
                                                 
17 The US Social Security program uses this method computed over a 75 year period.   16
would take into account future salary levels but not future increases due to post-retirement 
indexation.  This is known as the Projected Benefit Obligation, or PBO.  Finally, one could 
take into account post-retirement adjustments, as is commonly done in the Netherlands.  
This is known as the Indexed Benefit Obligation, or IBO.
18  The accumulated plan benefit 
method advocated by the US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) is a continued 
accrual liability that ignores future salary increases.   
Table 3 compares minimum funding rules in various OECD countries as described in Davis 
(1995).  Not surprisingly, the actuarial assumptions used to calculate these different liabilities 
also vary across and within countries.  In the Netherlands, a maximum discount rate of 4 
percent is allowed for actuarial purposes (Zweekhorst, 1990).  In the United Kingdom, 
pension actuaries are given wide discretion regarding most of the assumptions.  Illustrations 
from the United States show that actuarial assumptions are not arbitrary and stem from 
incentives to overfund or underfund in order to take advantage of tax exemptions or deal 
with firm-specific cash-flow problems.  To the extent that accounting standards and 
government regulations allow it, private pension plans will invariably choose the most 
favorable methods and assumptions for tax or liquidity purposes. 
For example, firms wishing to reduce contributions in a particular year in order to make their 
balance sheets look more favorable often change interest rate assumptions in a way that 
reduces expected liabilities or increases expected assets.  When the discount rate is not set at 
a specific level, the firm’s actuary can increase its assumed rate of return on investments 
while simultaneously discounting future benefit promises at a higher rate.  Anecdotal 
(Willinger, 1992) and econometric (Feldstein and Morck, 1982) evidence of this 
phenomenon has been documented in the United States, and the practice has been observed 
in US state and local governments. 
In addition to the assumptions regarding future salary effects on pension benefits and the 
interest rate used, the calculation of the accrued termination liability requires the use of 
mortality tables.  These may not always reflect the special characteristics of the covered 
population of the scheme, for example when unisex mortality tables are used in an industry 
that  has a disproportionate number of males or females.  In addition, systematic 
relationships between occupation, income and other factors affecting mortality rates will 
influence the true value of the liability. 
                                                 
18 See Bodie (1990) for a discussion.   17
Table 3.  Funding Rules for Private Pensions in Selected OECD Countries 
 
Country  Regulation of Funding 
United States  Funding of ABO obligatory. Maximum 50 percent overfund of the 
insurance premia if underfunded. 
United 
Kingdom 
Maximum 5 percent overfund of PBO or IBO.  Funding only obligatory 
for part of social security. 
Germany  Funding obligatory up to PBO.  Option of book-reserve funding. 
Japan  Tax exempt up to ABO only.  Option of book-reserve funding. 
Canada  Maximum 5 percent overfund of PBO.  Funding obligatory. 
Netherlands  Funding obligatory for PBO.  IBO usually funded. 
Sweden  IBO is funded.  Contribution rate is 5 yearly to balance fund. 
Denmark  Irrelevant as funded contribution; benefits must be funded  
Switzerland  Funding only obligatory for ABO; PBO usually funded.  4 percent to 
accounts annually. 
Australia  Irrelevant as defined contribution; minimum contribution rate. 
France  Funded company schemes forbidden; book-reserve funding subject to 
discrimination. 
Italy No  pension. 
Source:  Davis (1995): 94-95. 
 
The private sector experience regarding valuation methods of unfunded pension liabilities 
provides some useful lessons for those attempting to do the same for the public sector.  First, it 
is clear that a variety of methods are used across countries and that the choice of method will 
lead to significant differences in the value of the liability.  It is also apparent that certain 
rationale, such as the need to provide information for investors, are relevant for government 
mandated schemes.  Even when private pension liabilities are not stated clearly, the market 
appears to take them into account.  This is probably true for public pension liabilities as well, 
but there is no research to substantiate this assertion, partly because cross-country IPD 
estimates are not available.  Finally, from a practical perspective, some of the methods will be 
easier to apply in a standardized manner across countries.  The next subsection reviews 
attempts to apply some of these valuation techniques to public pension schemes. 
4. Estimates of Pension Liabilities in the Public Sector 
 
Country estimates exist for all three types of public pension liabilities described in Table 1  – 
unfunded defined benefit schemes and guarantees for voluntary and mandatory private   18
schemes.
19  This section briefly reviews some of the existing cross-country estimates that have 
been made for public defined benefit schemes. 
The implications of the IPD for fiscal sustainability have motivated several cross-country 
studies (Table 4).  The earliest was the OECD study by van der Noord and Herd (1993) that 
calculated the unfunded pension liabilities of seven industrialized countries in 1990.  It presents 
a type of gross pension liability based on a definition similar to the accrued benefit obligation 
(ABO) described above alongside a net pension liability measure based on projections through 
the year 2150.  In this particular case, the ABO method takes into account future wage growth, 
mortality rates, and existing public pension reserves.  The authors find that the accrued pension 
rights are roughly double the conventionally defined public debt. 
 
Table 4.  Estimates of Implicit Pension Debt and General Government Debt, 





a Kune (PBO) Kune (ABO)  General 
Gross Debt
b
Belgium  -  -  101 75 136 
Canada 121  94  -  -  96 
Denmark -  -  117 87  69 
France  216 265 112  83  48 
Greece  -  -  245 185 114 
Ireland - -  78  55  - 
Italy  242 357 207 157 129 
Japan 162  166  - -  83 
Luxembourg -  -  219  156  - 
Netherlands -  -  144  103  79 
Portugal -  - 128  93 71 
Spain -  -  129  93  63 
Sweden -  131  -  - 92 
United 
Kingdom 
156  117  92 68 46 
United States  113  106  -  -  69 
West 
Germany 
157 221 186 138  50 
a Refers to sum of present liability to pensioners and current workforce. 
b General government gross public debt in 1994 from Mussa and Masson (1995). 
                                                 
19 For example, Ippolito (1984) presents estimates for the private sector guarantees of the Pension Benefit 
Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) in the US.  Wagner (1991) estimates of the present value of the future costs of 
the minimum pension guarantee in Chile.   19
The International Monetary Fund calculated the pension debt for eight OECD countries 
(Chand and Jaeger, 1996).  Again, both net and gross concepts are presented and found to be 
large relative to conventional public debt.  The gross liability concept is calculated based on 
projected benefit payments to current retirees and workers.  Projected new pension rights are 
also included in the gross liability calculation but are excluded here for comparability. 
Finally, Kune (1996) calculated a continued accrual liability using both PBO and ABO type 
definitions for twelve European Union members in 1990.  The covered population over 25 
years of age is considered and benefits for survivors under age 65 are not taken into account.  
The current value of average real pensions is used for the calculation of workers’ accrued rights, 
and future increases in life expectancy are not taken into account.  The ABO method prorates 
the PBO value by the ratio of number of years of participation in the scheme to the assumed 
maximum 40 years of participation.  It is not clear if changes due to age earnings profiles or 
other factors (unemployment, maternity periods, etc.) are taken into account.  The prorata 
factor is based on age rather than actual contribution history.  
It is interesting to note some of the differences in the results.  Kune (1996) reports the lowest 
IPD figures, although Greece is found to have a very large IPD.  This seems to be caused by 
several factors:  First, there are slight differences in the discount rates, with the OECD study 
using 4 percent but falling step-wise after 2050 to 3 percent and Kune remaining at 4 percent 
throughout.  More importantly, the OECD study takes into account future earnings growth, 
while Kune uses the current real value of pensions for both PBO and ABO calculations.  Third, 
Kune does not consider increasing life expectancy, while the OECD study uses population 
projections from the World Bank that should incorporate such changes.  
While these factors explain some of the differences, others are based on definition.  The French 
IPD in the Kune study excludes the supplementary regimes, while this is included in the OECD 
study.  The decision by the OECD authors seems correct given that these are state-mandated, 
pay-as-you-go schemes.  By their nature, they give rise to all of the same intergenerational fiscal 
concerns as the centrally managed PAYG schemes and should be counted as part of the IPD.  
A significant difference is also apparent in the case of the United Kingdom.  The OECD study 
finds a much higher IPD figure than Kune that is not explained by discount rate differences.  
Highlighting the importance of definitions, the IMF study covers a smaller portion of the 
overall public pension schemes than the OECD study.  For example, the IMF projections 
exclude about one-third of spending in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and 
Germany, and almost 40 percent of Swedish pension spending. 
Several important conclusions can be drawn from the results.  First, the IPD is found to be very 
large regardless of the methodology or definition.  Second, there is a significant degree of 
variation across the countries.  Third, the estimates are quite sensitive to methodology and 
definitions.  Finally, it is clear that the projection of benefits, especially for workers, requires 
many strong assumptions and is very data intensive.  In each of the studies, stylized models 
were used instead of the actual eligibility and benefit rules of each system in making the 
projections. 
   20
IV. Standardized International Estimates of IPD 
 
The previous sections have highlighted the importance of good IPD estimates but have also 
revealed that no accepted and universally applied methodology has yet emerged.  As a result, 
international estimates vary in terms of concepts, assumptions, applied models and, 
therefore, in the estimated magnitude of the IPD.  This section suggests using the accrued-
to-date or termination liability and proposes a pragmatic methodology to estimate IPD in an 
internationally comparable manner.  Estimates for 24 countries are presented from a variety 
of regions and income levels. 
1. Towards a Practical Termination Liability Approach to IPD 
 
A practical termination liability approach is suggested for international comparisons of IPD 
for four main reasons.  It is less prone to meddling, avoids questionable assumptions about 
the revenue side, does not require projections of many future variables, and most 
importantly, is the measure most relevant for pension reformers. 
The estimated IPD should answer the question, “What is the present value of the payment 
stream that the pension scheme will have to pay current participants and their survivors for 
the contributions made up to the current date, provided the rules of the scheme stay the 
same?”  This definition includes probabilities that current contributors may die or become 
disabled before reaching pensionable age.  It also includes future changes of the payment 
stream due to any legislation enacted prior to the year for which IPD is being calculated.
20  
An alternative definition of termination liability would be the amount required today to pay 
off all members of the scheme (for example, the Chilean “bonos de reconocimiento” to 
compensate voluntary switchers to the new funded scheme for acquired rights under the old 
one).
21  In some countries, this type of valuation has produced a lower ex post IPD because 
individuals have accepted less than the face value of their pension promises in the process of 
privatization.
22  Since this discounting depends on the credibility of the scheme in each 
particular country, we choose to ignore this and consider the termination liability here as an 
upper bound.
23  
Using the gross liability in a termination context as opposed to the net concept preempts the 
potential complications of projecting the revenue stream for each country.  This in turn 
avoids entering into prolonged discussions about cross-country differences in issues such as 
projected coverage rates and evasion, or how to deal with government transfers to the 
pension scheme.  Many schemes are designed to cover the gap between contributions and 
pension payments with central budget transfers or even earmarked non-payroll taxes.   
                                                 
20  For example, where the retirement age increase is being phased in gradually and will rise in the future, this 
would be taken into account in the calculation. 
21  For a detailed description of the Chilean recognition bond see Arena de Mesa and Cullel (1993). 
22  An interesting feature of a public scheme termination is the revealed value of accrued obligations in the 
pension scheme in the process of a voluntary, opt-out to a funded, defined contribution scheme.  In many 
cases, individuals appear to discount the public pension promises relative to the types of IPD measures 
discussed here, reflecting a political risk associated with the promise.  For a discussion, see Palacios and 
Whitehouse (1998). 
23  Another way to think about it is that pension debt, like conventional bonds are risky and that the probability 
of default varies by country and over time.  In a privatization with a voluntary switch, a secondary market of a 
sort is created for the IPD and this has often ‘traded’ at below face value.   21
Austria, Germany, and Switzerland have public pension schemes designed to be 
“unbalanced” from the standpoint of a pure pay-as-you-go model.  France earmarks a wealth 
tax to finance its social security programs, while Argentina earmarks certain consumption 
taxes.  In this situation, in order to calculate future earmarked revenues, it would be 
necessary to project the revenues from other earmarked, non-payroll taxes.  Most 
importantly, it requires a much larger number of rather heroic assumptions regarding future 
compliance rates and other revenue-side factors.  In most developing countries, an estimated 
net liability/actuarial balance could move from positive to negative with a relatively small 
increase in evasion. 
Minimizing the role of assumptions on the expenditure side is another reason for using the 
termination concept.  Under all other concepts, the present value of future expenditure for 
an arbitrarily chosen period requires projection of future labor market participation, 
including retirement behavior, benefit levels, demographics, coverage rates, and many other 
variables.  Making consistent assumptions in a cross-country context is almost impossible.  
Using the termination concept avoids many of these problems since there is no need for 
projections of many future variables that will affect the value of the pension promise.  The 
one exception in our calculations is mortality rates; here, we apply projected mortality rates 
that usually incorporate improvements in life expectancy.   
Finally, and perhaps, most importantly, the termination liability is the most robust indicator 
for measuring the impact of a fundamental pension reform that involves a shift from a pay-
as-you-go, defined benefit scheme to a privately-managed and funded pension scheme.  To 
the extent that such terminations are likely to occur, this measure is a useful baseline for the 
reform debate and for the fiscal/macroeconomic analysis of the reform proposal.  The 
partial or full termination of pay-as-you-go schemes has begun in 10 Latin American 
countries, at least 4 former socialist countries in Eastern Europe or Central Asia, the United 
Kingdom, and Sweden.
24  It is being planned or seriously discussed in at least a dozen other 
countries including the United States.  Whether or not such a reform is implemented, 
however, the emphasis on already acquired pension rights versus rights yet to be acquired 
seems appropriate given the relative difficulty in changing the former relative to the latter.
25 
2. Methodology, Assumptions and Model for Calculating the IPD 
 
A detailed description of the methodology used to calculate the IPD is found in the Annex 
along with data requirements, assumptions, and a description of the model.  As mentioned, 
we have opted for the gross termination concept where the obligations of the public pension 
scheme for all current members of the scheme are estimated.   
There are two main components of the IPD in this context:  The first is a relatively 
straightforward calculation of the present value of the annuity stream paid to current living 
pensioners, including disabled, survivors, and old age/retirement pensioners.  Using age- and 
sex-specific age cohorts (one year), the payments made to each cohort are tracked until the 
                                                 
24 See Palacios and Pallares-Miralles (2000) for further details. 
25 In the last decade, the value of defined pension benefits in public schemes have been revised downward for 
future generations of retirees in the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, the United States, France, and Italy, to 
name only a few cases.   22
last person in the youngest cohort has died
26 and the present value of the payments promised 
to them is calculated under different discount rate assumptions.
27 
The second component, the obligations to current members of the scheme who have not yet 
begun to receive benefits, is more complicated.  One approach would be to prorate the 
obligations to current contributors based on a projected number of future contributions and 
wage growth and application of the existing benefit formula.  However, this method ignores 
those individuals that have not contributed in the current year but who nevertheless have 
acquired rights to a pension based on earlier contributions.   
In order to account for these “dormant members” and to more accurately reflect the actual 
observed years of contribution for retiring cohorts in each country, the estimated IPD for 
non-retired members is “backed out” by discounting projected benefit spending on 
individual cohorts and prorating these by the number of contribution years that can be 
assigned to a particular cohort.  For example, the present value of the benefits paid to the 
cohort of 50-year old males would be projected until the entire cohort is assumed to have 
died.  Then the current accumulated number of contribution years for the same cohort in 
the year for which the IPD is calculated is divided by the eventual number of contribution 
years at retirement.  This is done to prorate the present value of projected expenditures in 
line with obligations already incurred at the moment of the hypothetical termination.  The 
result is the estimate of the IPD for the current active or dormant non-retired members. 
Wage growth and the discount rate are the two important assumptions for estimating IPD.  
Real versus nominal wage growth matters in case of price indexation of benefits and non-
wage valorization of wage records for initial benefit calculation.  While legal indexation rules 
differ between countries, actual implementation often deviates from the rules, rendering 
identical assumptions a useful benchmark.  For this reason we assume in the main scenario 
calculation that both wage records and benefits are wage indexed, rendering the estimated 
IPD an upper bound for a chosen discount rate; the results for other indexation assumptions 
are presented in the Annex.  The selected alternative discount rates are 2, 4 and 5 percent, 
respectively.
28  Using a higher discount rate clearly reduces the estimated IPD.  But if all or 
part of the IPD were to be made explicit and debt financed in the course of a pension 
reform, a higher discount rate would increase the “true transition deficit” which is the 
product of interest rate–wage growth difference and the stock of explicit pension debt.   
These are the additional budgetary resources needed to avoid an increase in the total debt 
(implicit plus explicit) as a percent of GDP (Holzmann, 1998).
29 
                                                 
26 It is important to note that we are forced to use national mortality tables for these calculations instead of 
membership mortality experience.  The main effect is to understate pension liabilities in countries with lower 
coverage rates, especially where the distribution of resources is skewed. 
27 For survivors a cruder method is applied.  We assume that if current payments for survivors constitute 10 
percent of all pension spending, then 10 percent of IPD is due to survivors. We use this simplification because 
survivors benefit can be terminated for other reasons than death and modeling this complexity would make the 
results less transparent with marginal impact on the total IPD.   
28 Hence, under the 2 percent discount rate assumption, wage growth and discount rate are the same, 
presenting somewhat the upper bound of any estimated IPD.  Discount rates of 4 and 5 percent, respectively, 
represent discount rate-wage indexation differentials of 2 and 3 percent, respectively.   
29 This assumes steady state conditions in which wage growth equals GDP growth and where the discount rate 
reflects the market rate of interest for government borrowing.     23
To produce comparable estimates for different countries, the same model should be used.  
Country-specific models lack the common structure and often common assumptions for 
cross-country comparisons.  On the other hand, cross-country estimates of IPD to date rely 
on stylized presentations of the pension scheme(s) under investigation, rendering the results 
insensitive to country particularities.  The following estimates are based on the World Bank’s 
Pension Reform Option Simulation Toolkit (PROST), a model that strikes a balance 
between the two polar cases.  It is flexible enough to incorporate most of a country’s 
idiosyncratic pension system features but imposes a common structure on all countries in 
the analysis.  In most cases, the model has been tested in the context of pension reform 
analyses. 
3. IPD Estimates for 35 Low and Middle Income Countries 
 
Table 5 presents the IPD estimates for 35 low and middle income countries under 
alternative discount rate assumptions and compares them with official public debt, 
expenditure levels, and existing financial reserves (all in percent of GDP).  Several results 
stand out. 
First, the estimated IPD is large relative to national incomes in our sample of countries but 
there is a huge range.  Using the two percent discount rate, Brazil’s IPD is 500 percent of 
GDP, ten times more than Morocco.  Even using the higher, five percent discount rate, 18 
out of 35 countries had IPDs greater than national income. 
Not surprisingly, the former socialist countries and especially Central Europe, have the 
highest IPD burdens measured this way.  Of the 19 countries with IDPs of at least 200 
percent of GDP, 12 of them are from this region (using a discount rate of 2 percent).  This 
reflects the high labor force coverage that characterized countries in this region and relatively 
generous benefit levels, combined with an aging population.  Uruguay is another country 
with a large state apparatus and high social expenditures and has the oldest demographic 
structure in Latin America.   At the other end of the spectrum are younger countries like 
Senegal and Morocco where coverage is much lower than what had been found in pre-
transition Central Europe.  Nevertheless, the levels of pension debt even in these countries 
is too significant to ignore. 
IPDs are high relative to conventionally defined public debt for most countries.  Only a few 
countries (Cape Verde, Ecuador, Korea, Morocco, Nicaragua, Peru and Senegal) have higher 
explicit public debt than IPD even when using the 5 percent discount rate case.  This result 
highlights the importance of this indicator for a proper assessment of long-term fiscal 
sustainability.  It is also a measure of just how difficult a rapid shift from an unfunded 
system to a funded pension scheme would be in some countries.  Last but not least, these 
figures suggest that pension debt or wealth could be a significant factor in determining 
savings behavior in many developing countries.   24
 
Table 5.  Public debt, pension spending and implicit pension debt for 35 low and 
middle income countries for various years during the end-1990s and 2000 
 




Spending  2% 4% 5% 
  as share of GDP 
Brazil  33 9  500 330 275 
Macedonia  41 9  441 291 244 
Slovenia  25 11  429 298 255 
Romania  18 6  386 256 214 
Poland  43 12  379 261 220 
Ukraine  59 9  365 257 220 
Portugal  55 5  358 233 193 
Malta  56 5  356 234 194 
Slovakia  31 8  304 210 179 
Hungary  59 9  300 203 171 
Uruguay  45 14  295 214 187 
Kyrgyz  Rep.  135 7  282 185 154 
Croatia  33 11  274 201 175 
Estonia  7  9  268 189 163 
Moldova  78 8  229 159 136 
Lithuania  28 7  221 155 134 
Nicaragua  109 2  220 131 104 
Turkey  65 5  217 146 123 
Costa Rica  34  2  203  121  97 
Philippines 71 1  185  107 81 
Iran  10  2 146  89 72 
Bolivia  56  4 111  73 62 
Argentina  53  5 106  85 78 
Ecuador  209  1 103  63 51 
Mexico  19  1 101  65 54 
Colombia  24  2  88 56 46 
Dominican  Rep.  23  1  80 49 40 
Cape  Verde  52  1  78 47 38 
Chile  9 7  77 60 53 
Senegal  78  2  73 51 44 
Mauritius  35  3  63 47 42 
El  Salvador  22  2  60 43 37 
Peru  43  2  57 40 34 
Korea  33  1  57 33 26 
Morocco  79  1  50 32 26 
Sources: Own calculations and public debt data based on SAVEM tables (World Bank), At-a-glance tables 
prepared for the Annual Meetings (World Bank), and various IMF statistics on Article IV consultations.   25
To what extent do these estimates simply reflect differences in current spending levels?  
While there is the expected positive correlation between the IPD and pension expenditure, 
the fitted line in Figure 1 below suggests that current spending is not a reliable predictor of 
pension debt in this sample of countries.  This probably is due to the differential maturity of 
the schemes.  A drastic example is Korea, where full benefits in the main scheme covering 
private sector workers will be first paid in 2008 (20 years after introduction) and hence 
current pension expenditure is very low, while IPD after 10 years of introduction already 
amounts to 47 percent (with reserves equal to only 10 percent of GDP).  Beside maturity, 
differences in these ratios are also due to demographic aging patterns.  A higher old-age 
dependency ratio increases, other things equal, both the IPD and expenditure shares, but 
differences in future dependency ratios first impact IPD before also translating into higher 
pension expenditure shares.   
Finally, it is important to note that alternative indexation of wage records and benefits 
changes the estimated IPDs but not dramatically in most countries (see Annex Table A).  
Moving from wage to price indexation of benefits reduces IPD, on average, by some 15 to 
20 percent, with a lower reduction the higher the discount rate.   
Current pension spending levels will fail to reflect reforms that are being gradually phased in 
or changes to indexation which have large compounded impacts.  The IPD numbers capture 
this, therefore providing a more accurate assessment of the long term burden compared 
across countries.
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Figure 1  Pension spending and IPD estimates for 35 countries 
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30   Another relevant measure for the purposes of assessing sustainability is the ratio of IPD to the wage bill 
subject to contributions.  Using this measure highlights the problems of poor countries such as Senegal in 
servicing its IPD despite having a relatively low IPD/GDP ratio.     26
V. Conclusion and Directions for Future Research  
 
The results of the last section show that the IPD represents a fiscal burden that cannot be 
ignored in low- and middle-income countries.  There are many compelling reasons for reporting 
a standardized measure of the IPD alongside the commonly cited public debt indicators. 
First, social insurance obligations are often the largest single unreported liability in the public 
sphere.  Even in countries with small, immature schemes, these obligations are the fastest 
growing of these liabilities.  The growth is determined by the maturation of the schemes but 
also by population aging. 
Second, the IPD provides a tool with which to evaluate pension reform that does not currently 
exist.  Reductions to the IPD due to marginal changes such as increasing the effective 
retirement age or altering the benefit indexation rules could be readily measured.  More 
importantly, however, an IPD measure allows for a better understanding of the impact of 
systemic changes that involve partial privatization of the unfunded public scheme.  Currently, 
the accounting is biased towards the unfunded schemes since as IPD is made explicit, the target 
debt indicator rises in the short run.  By showing that the IPD is reduced by a similar 
magnitude, a clearer picture of the effect of reform on long-term fiscal sustainability can be 
presented. 
Third, a reported IPD might discourage the creation of new liabilities as stop-gap measures 
during crises (for example, early retirement in Eastern Europe during the transition).  Currently, 
the accounting provides a great temptation to choose off-the-book liabilities instead of going 
through the effort required to issue tradeable debt and control the size of explicit public debt. 
Finally, standardized IPD estimates would add an element of transparency to publicly managed, 
defined benefit schemes around the world that is sorely lacking.  Most workers (and most 
voters) in countries with pay-as-you-go pension schemes are not aware of the magnitude of 
these liabilities.  Including the IPD as a footnote to government accounts would provide the 
type of useful disclosure often required of publicly listed firms in their annual reports to 
shareholders.  The standardized IPD would allow cross-country comparisons, including in the 
area of sovereign risk rating. 
This raises several interesting issues for future research.  On the one hand, to the extent that the 
financial markets experienced fiscal illusion, alerting them to the existence of debt could have a 
negative impact on credit ratings, borrowing spreads, and direct investment flows.
31  More 
likely, however, is that financial markets already take a crude measure of the IPD into account.  
Reporting it would reduce uncertainty, which would be positive on the whole. 
The reaction of financial markets to making the IPD explicit has not been studied.  Further 
research analogous to that in the existing literature on the impact of unfunded pension liabilities 
on firm valuation would be useful.  Previous studies suggest that the markets do take unfunded 
pension liabilities into account when determining share prices (Feldstein and Seligman, 1981).  
It seems reasonable to expect that the financial markets are already considering IPD, especially 
                                                 
31  There is mixed evidence on the impact of unfunded pension liabilities on sovereign risk rating.  
Increasingly however, these liabilities are explicitly analyzed by credit rating agencies such as Standard 
and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch.  See for examples, Standard and Poors (2002) and Fitch (2003).   27
in countries where it is extremely large and the repayment schedule is concentrated in a period 
relevant for the yield curve on government paper.
32 
A more important question perhaps, is the reaction of the financial markets to a radical pension 
reform in which IPD is converted into an explicit, observable debt.  Again, there does not seem 
to be research on this question for the countries in which radical reform actually took place.  
One testable hypothesis is that the reaction will depend on whether the markets perceive that 
the IPD had been reduced in the reform process so that the overall balance sheet of the 
government had improved.       
Last but not least, systematic measures of IPD would allow for an extension of the literature on 
the impact of pay-as-you-go pension schemes on national savings.  The equivalent of 
Feldstein’s social security wealth variable would now be available for a large set of countries and 
eventually for multiple years.  Along with parallel research based on household survey data, 
these aggregate indicators could be used in cross-country studies of the determinants of savings 
rates. 
We conclude that some reasonable measure of IPD should be reported in a standardized way 
for low and middle income countries, for example, as a memorandum item standard fiscal 
accounts such as the IMF’s GFS statistics.  Access to this indicator will improve our 
understanding of savings, financial market behavior and fiscal sustainability.  It will help inform 
the reform debate in each country.  And it will help reformers design reforms with feasible 
transitions and assess the fiscal impact of their options.  Had an IPD measure been as clearly 
reported as public deficit and debt targets, fewer reforms would be needed and fewer pension 
promises would have to be broken. 
 
                                                 
32 To the extent that this contention is true, the current accounting systems can be said to unjustly penalize 
reformer countries when multilateral institutions such as the IMF focus on current deficit and conventional 
debt targets.   28
References 
 
Arena de Mesa, and M. Cullel (1993) “Proyecciones del Gasto Previsional 1992-2038. Un 
Modelo de Simulación para los Bonos de Reconocimiento”, República de Chile, Ministerio 
de Hacienda, Dirección de Presupuestos. Santiago, Chile. 
Archer, M. (1991) “Chapter 4:  Minimum Funding Requirements”, in Wald, M., and D. Kenty, 
eds., ERISA: A Comprehensive Guide. New York: Wiley and Sons. 
Auerbach, A., L. Kotlikoff, and W. Leibfritz, eds. (1999) Generational Accounting around 
the World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Banks, J., Disney, R., and Smith, Z. (2000) “What can we learn from Generational Accounts 
for the United Kingdom? “ Economic Journal Features, 110, November, F575-F597.  
Beltrametti, L. (1996) “Il debito pensionistico in Italia”, Societa Editrice il Mulino, Bologna, 
Italy. 
Bodie, Z. (1990) “ABO, the PBO and Pension Investment Policy”, Financial Analysts 
Journal 46: 27-34.  
Buchanan, J. (1968) “Social Insurance in a Growing Economy:  A Proposal for Radical 
Reform,” National Tax Journal 21(4), 386-395. 
Chand, S., and A. Jaeger (1996) “Aging Populations and Public Pension Schemes” Occasional 
Paper 147, International Monetary Fund: Washington D.C. 
Chilean Superintendency of AFP's (1996)  “Boletín Estadístico”.  Superintendencia de 
Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones.  Santiago, Chile. 
Disney, R. (forthcoming) “How should we measure pension liabilities in EU Countries”, in 
Evaluating the long-term sustainability of European pension systems. Kluwer. 
Davis, E. P. (1995) Pension Funds, Retirement-Income Security and Capital Markets, an 
International Perspective. Oxford University Press. 
Disney, R. (1999) “OECD Public Pension Programmes in Crisis: An Evaluation of the 
Reform Options”. Pension Primer Paper Series. Social Protection Discussion Paper. No. 
9921. World Bank: Washington D.C. 
Feldstein, M. (1974) “Social security, induced retirement, and aggregate capital 
accumulation”, Journal of Political Economy 82: 905-26. 
Feldstein, M., and R. Morck (1982) “Pension Funding Decisions, Interest Rate Assumptions 
and Share Prices.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series No. 938: 
1-44. Cambridge, MA. 
Feldstein, M., and S. Seligman (1981) “Pension Funding, Share Prices, and National Savings”, 
The Journal of Finance, 36( 4). 
Fitch Ratings (2003) “Colombia Needs Viable Plan to Target Pension Problem”.   
Franco, D (1995) “Pension liabilities – Their Use and Misuse in the Assessment of Fiscal 
Policies”, European Commission, Directorate General for Economic and financial affairs, 
Economic Papers, No.110.   29
Gál, R. A. Simonovits and G. Tarcali (2001) “Generation Accounting and the Hungarian 
Pension Reform”, Budapest (mimeo), forthcoming as Social Protection Discussion Paper. 
The World Bank: Washington D.C. 
Hills, J. (1984) “Public Assets and Liabilities and the Presentation of Budgetary Policy”, in 
Public Finance in Perspective, Report Series No.8, Institute for Fiscal Studies, London.  
Hochreiter, E., G. Winckler, and P. Brandner (1998) “Deficits, Debts and Monetary Union - 
Some Unpleasant Fiscal Arithmetic,” in: Guillermo Calvo, Mervyn King, eds., The Debt 
Burden and its Consequences for Monetary Policy. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire 
and London: International Economic Association, MacMillan Press. 
Holzmann, R. (1998) “Financing the Transition”, Social Protection Discussion Paper. No. 
9814. The World Bank: Washington, D.C. 
Holzmann, R. (1999) “On the Economic Benefits and Fiscal Requirements of Moving from 
Unfunded to Funded Pensions”, in Buti, M., Franco, D. and Pench, L. (eds.): The Welfare 
State in Europe, Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, UL and Northampton, MA, 139-196. 
International Monetary Fund (1999) Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, IMF: 
Washington, D.C. 
Ippolito, D. (1984) Hidden Spending: the Politics of Federal Credit. Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press. 
Kotlikoff, L. (1986) “Deficit Delusion”, in What Determines Savings, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Kotlikoff, L., and B. Raffelhueschen (1999) “Generational Accounting Around the Globe”, 
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 89(2), 161-166. 
Kune, J. (1996)  “The Hidden Liabilities: Meaning and Consequences,” revised version of a 
paper presented at the CBP Seminar Series, The Hague (mimeo). 
Murakami, K. (1990) “Chapter 8: Severance and Retirement Benefits in Japan”, in US 
Department of Labor, Pension Policy: An International Perspective. Washington, D.C. 
Mussa, M., and P. Masson (1995) “Long-Term Tendencies in Budget Deficits and Debt”, IMF 
Research Department paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Symposium 
on “Budget Deficits and Debt: Issues and Options,” September. 
Palacios, R., and E. Whitehouse (1998) “The Role of Choice in the Transition to a Funded 
Pension System”, Social Protection Discussion Paper Series No. 9812. The World Bank: 
Washington, D.C. 
Palacios, R., and M. Pallares-Miralles (2000) “International Patterns of Pension Provision”, 
Social Protection Discussion Paper Series.  No. 0004. The World Bank: Washington D.C. 
Palmer, E. (2000) “The Swedish Pension Reform Model: Framework and Issues”, Social 
Protection Discussion Paper.  No. 0012. The World Bank: Washington D.C. 
Rizzo, I. (1990) “The ‘Hidden Debt’”, Financial and Monetary Policy Studies, 19. Dordrecht-
Boston-London: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Schmidt-Hebbel, K. and L. Serven (1999) The Economics of Saving and Growth – Theory, 
Evidence and Implications for Policy. Cambridge University Press.   30
Schwarz, A., and A. Demirguc-Kunt (1999) “Taking Stock of Pension Reforms Around the 
World”, Social Protection Discussion Paper No. 9917. The World Bank: Washington, D.C. 
Social Security Committee – British House of Commons (1996) “Unfunded Pension Liabilities 
in the European Union”, UK Government, London. 
Standard and Poors (2002) “Commentary:  Rating Mexican State and Municipal Pension 
Funds”, Mexico City. 
Valdes-Prieto, S. (2000) “The Financial Stability of Notional Account Pensions”, 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 102(3): 395-417. 
Van der Noord, P., and R. Herd (1993) “Pension Liabilities in the Seven Major Economies”, 
Working Paper No. 142:1-64. OECD Economics Department, Paris. 
Wagner, G. (1991) “La Seguridad Social y el Programa de Pensión Mínima Garantizada”. 
Estudios de Economía 18 (1) : 35-89. Santiago, Chile. 
Washawsky, M. (1989) “The Institutional and Regulatory Environment of Private Defined 
Benefit Pension Plans”, in U.S. Department of Labor, Trends in Pensions, Washington D.C. 
Willinger, U. (1992) “A Simulation Comparison of Actuarial and Contingent Claims Models for 
Unfunded Pension Liabilities”, Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics 31(2), Spring. 
World Bank (1994) Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and Promote 
Growth.  The World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
World Bank (1999) World Development Indicators, Washington D.C. 
Yun, S. (2000) “Generational Accounting for Korea with Special Reference to Pension 
Schemes”, KIHASA working paper, Seoul Korea. 
Zweekhorst, K. (1990) “Chapter 10: Developments in Private Pensions in the Netherlands”, in 
US Department of Labor, Pension Policy: An International Perspective. Washington, D.C.   31
Annex:  Methodology of IPD Estimation, Data Requirement, and Assumptions 
 
Criteria on which the methodology used for the IPD estimation is based. The IPD 
focuses on expenditures and not the stream of anticipated earmarked revenues. The IPD is a 
termination liability in that it represents the outstanding obligations that would have to be 
paid in the event that the scheme were discontinued. However, in order to avoid the 
subjective assumptions about the likely value of accrued to date pension liabilities in a real 
termination scenario, we focus on a  “projected liability,” defined as the present value of the 
expected payment stream to current pension plan participants based on the contributions 
made up to the current date.  This definition includes probabilities that current contributors 
might die or become disabled before reaching pensionable age.  It also includes future 
changes of the payment stream due to the legislation enacted prior to the year for which IPD 
is being calculated.  We also recognize that this method ignores or reduces the effect of 
minimum vesting periods and non-linear accrual rate schedules.  
Only pension benefit expenditures are taken into account.  Administrative costs and non-
pension related activities of the pension scheme are ignored. Explicit accumulated debt 
related to pensions and recognition bonds are excluded from calculations. 
The data requirements should not be too onerous to exclude a large number of countries 
from the potential sample. 
Assumptions about coverage expansion and contraction that would normally differ across 
countries should not affect the estimates.  Non-members, defined as everyone who has 
never contributed (or for whom there is no clear claim to a future benefit) to the scheme at 
the time the IPD is calculated, are not considered. 
Population projections.  An age- and gender-specific population matrix is projected using 
the current stock of population and assumptions about fertility and mortality.  The 
projection is made until the year 2075.  The end year is chosen such that the current 
youngest contributors (aged 20 in year 2000) could be followed through until practically 
everyone in the cohort dies (aged 95 in 2075).  All demographic data is taken from World 
Bank population database (E. Bos, M.T. Vu, E. Massiah, R.A. Bulatao (1994): World 
Population Projections 1994-95, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD.) 
Projecting contributors and beneficiaries and determining average length of service. 
Contributor to population ratios are derived by dividing current stock of contributors by the 
population of corresponding age and gender.  Similar ratios are calculated for pensioners 
receiving old age, disability  and survivors’ benefits.  It is assumed that these ratios will 
remain stable for each age/sex specific cohort.  
Making a reasonable projection of pensioner numbers is less straightforward.  Clearly, the 
number of pensioners in the future should depend on the current number of active 
contributors.  There might also be a significant number of “dormant memberships,” which 
also produce retirees.  It is almost impossible to get the data on the number of “dormant 
memberships,” however, average length of service at retirement may be a good proxy.  For 
example, the same sustained number of active contributors will produce twice as many 
pensioners if each retiree retires with 20 years of service compared with the scenario where 
each worker retires with 40 years of service.  This is because in the first scenario there are 
twice as many “dormant memberships,” that is, people spend a large proportion of their   32
adult lives not contributing to the system. Unfortunately, length of service data is also rarely 
available for the base year and has to be only guessed for the future years.  
To be consistent, the following rule was used.  First the cohort with highest coverage was 
chosen (a person is considered covered if he/she is an active contributor, old age pensioner, 
or disabled).  It was assumed that in the future, coverage in the oldest cohorts will converge 
to this level.  For example, consider a pension scheme that has just undergone expansion in 
contributor numbers and in which current contributor to population ratio peaks at 70 
percent in the 40-year old-age cohort.  Meanwhile,  the current old-age pensioner to 
population ratio peaks at 40 percent for 68 year olds. Then it is assumed that eventually 70 
percent of the population will retire under the pension scheme.  If the reverse is true and the 
scheme has undergone recent contraction where contributor ratio peaks at 40 percent and 
the pensioner to population ratio peaks at 70 percent, it is still assumed that in the future 70 
percent of the population will retire with benefits from the scheme.  In these examples, the 
first scenario will be characterized by much higher length of service at retirement than the 
second scheme, since the same proportion of the population eventually becoming 
pensioners is generated by a smaller proportion of contributors relative to population.  In 
short, our methodology assumes that contraction/expansion in the contributor numbers is 
first translated into lower/higher average length of service and only then into lower/higher 
number of pensioners.  Length of service determined this way is held constant throughout 
the simulation horizon. 
This approach is more reasonable for some countries than for others.  For example, in 
countries in the process of moving from a socialist to a market economy, unemployment 
gaps and informal labor market activity increased and the number of active contributors 
declined.  However, this decline in coverage mainly affects length of service but not the 
number of future retirees.  The scenario is also appropriate in countries that have recently 
raised the length of service requirement (Turkey).  These countries may find themselves with 
a greater numbers of contributors, but this is likely to be reflected only partially in the 
number of future pensioners.  The greatest impact will instead come via the average length 
of service periods for new pensioners.  On the other hand, countries that have undergone 
recent coverage expansion among the younger cohorts (for example, Costa Rica and Korea) 
are more likely to experience the growth in pensioner numbers than growth in length of 
service. 
After the total number of future retirees is assessed, it is distributed over the same retirement 
pattern (ages of retirement) as observed in the system in the base year.  For example, if 20 
percent of all current pensioners retired being 60 years old, it is assumed that 20 percent of 
future retirees will also retire at this age.  Admittedly, this methodology results in 
underestimating IPD for immature schemes (Korea), where the current new retirees might 
be older than the long term trend. In case of ongoing retirement age reform the retirement 
pattern is adjusted accordingly. 
Wage growth, post retirement benefit indexation and discount rates. It is assumed that 
there are no gender differentials in wages.  The productivity growth is assumed to be 2 
percent per year.  On top of that each worker gets a wage adjustment due to seniority, that is 
equal to 1 percent of the 20 year old male’s wage.  The complication of the seniority 
adjustment was introduced in order to help differentiate between countries that use short 
versus long wage histories in their benefit formulas.  For example, if the scheme gives a 
benefit equal to 50 percent of the average of 10 last wages (adjusted to the average wage 
growth), the total benefit will be less than in the scheme that uses 5 last wages as a base.    33
This is because the first scheme incorporates wages, that were earned in the earlier years of 
one’s career.  
The seniority component in wage growth is the same for all workers in nominal terms.  
However, percentage-wise, the component is lower for older workers.  This corresponds to 
the actual situation observed in the majority of the labor markets.  This non-linearity 
interacts with different demographic situations in different countries, producing different 
average wage growth.  For example, the countries with rapidly aging labor forces will be 
experiencing lower average wage growth than others.  However, the productivity growth is 
assumed to be the same in all countries.  
Benefits are assumed to be wage indexed.  This may appear to seriously skew the results in 
favor of those countries that actually do index benefits to wages as opposed to prices.   
However, the relationship that matters is the discount rate relative to the growth of wages.  
And since the correct discount rate (regardless of whether it reflects government or 
individuals time preference), would vary across countries, our preference is to remove this 
“noise” in favor of a standardized differential between the discount rate and the indexation 
rule. 
In order to test the sensitivity of the magnitudes involved, we have calculated IPD using 3 
different sets of discount rate differentials.  The calculations very clearly demonstrate that 
varying discount rate not only significantly changes the absolute value of IPD, but may also 
affect the relative position of the country when comparisons are made.  For example, using 
the discount rate of 2 percent, the IPD for Croatia was calculated to be 274 percent, and 
IPD for Kyrgyz Republic was slightly higher at 282 percent.  However, the term structure of 
this debt is very different in 2 countries.  In Croatia, which has recently started its transition 
to a significantly smaller PAYG system only 44 percent of total debt is due to current 
contributors.  On the other hand in Kyrgyz Republic, where the pension system is being 
reformed less ambitiously and where the expected aging of population is faster, debt to 
current contributors constitutes 68 percent.  Clearly, choosing the higher discount rate 
would reduce the IPD of the Kyrgyz Republic vis a vis Croatia.  And indeed, at 5 percent 
discount rate Kyrgyz Republic does seem to have a lower implicit pension debt  (IPD for 
Kyrgyz Republic is 154 percent and IPD for Croatia is 175 percent).  This observation holds 
true in general.  Countries, that are undergoing significant reforms to improve fiscal 
sustainability are favored in comparisons, when discount rates are low (Croatia, Estonia, 
Lithuania, and Poland), and countries with immature or expanding systems are favored 
under higher discount rates (Korea, Malta, Nicaragua, and the Philippines).  Countries with 
young but rapidly aging populations will also look better in comparison at higher discount 
rates. 
Replacement rates.  Replacement rates for new disabled and survivors are held constant 
and equal to the average observed replacement rates in those groups in the base year.  This 
clearly understates the implicit pension debt for immature schemes, where disability and 
survivor benefits are expected to grow as length of service rises (for example, Korea).  On 
the other hand it overstates the implicit pension debt for the countries that have recently 
experienced temporary increase in number of disabled and survivors (for example, Poland 
and Croatia).  (The effect of earlier retirement age dominates, that is, the present value of the 
average disability pension stream is higher than that of the old age pension stream, because it 
is being received for a longer time period.)  Replacement rates for new old age pensioners 
are derived using the benefit formula.   34
IPD for current old age pensioners and disabled.  Each cohort of current old age 
pensioners and disabled is followed through with the probability of death applied each year. 
The benefits of remaining beneficiaries are indexed to wage growth.  The resulting pension 
payments each year are aggregated among all cohorts and discounted to the base year, using 
the appropriate discount rate. 
IPD for current contributors.  Each year throughout the simulation horizon the expected 
number of new retirees and new disabled of each age and gender is derived based on the 
current beneficiary/population ratios and their benefits are calculated. Given the mortality 
assumptions and appropriate discount rate we convert these benefits into  lump sums, 
multiply them by the number of new retirees and add all of them up by age, gender and 
benefit program, getting the liability of the system to the people retiring that particular year.  
We then discount this liability back to the base year and take the portion of it that can be 
considered due to the contribution already paid based on a simple prorating of contributions 
made over projected contribution history.  For example, if the average retirement age in 
2020 is 58, careers usually start at 20 and we are calculating the IPD for year 2000, then we 
would take the portion (58-2020+2000)/(58-20) of the total liability to the new retirees of 
2020. 
Most of the studies that attempted to calculate IPD have taken a different approach. They 
take an individual contributor, assume that he/she will retire at average retirement age and 
prorate the full benefit at retirement using length of service or age of the contributor to 
figure out the prorating factor. Then the calculated debt for the individual is multiplied by 
the number of contributors of the same age. This approach has two downsides. First, the 
number of contributors usually does not include “dormant memberships,” that is, people 
who have been contributing to the system before, but were not contributing the year that the 
data was collected.  Second, the approach ignores the fact, that people retire at different 
ages.  As long as accrual rates around the average retirement age are not actuarially fair 
(usually they are not) the assumption of everybody retiring at the average age introduces 
unnecessary errors into the calculations. 
Deriving IPD for survivors.  IPD for survivors is calculated in the least precise manner.  If 
the survivor program represents a certain proportion of pension spending in the base year, 
the total liability for contributors, disabled and old age pensioners is augmented by the same 
proportion to get the IPD inclusive of survivors.  For example, if in the base year survivor 
pension payments constitute 20 percent of all pension payments, then we add implicit 
pension debt for current contributors, current old age pensioners and current disabled and 
then multiply this sum by 120 percent to get the total implicit pension debt. 
Data Requirements 
GDP in the base year 
Average annual insurable earnings (this can differ from average wage in the presence of 
contribution floors and ceilings) 
Total pension spending in the base year on old age pensioners (by gender), disability (by 
gender) and survivor schemes 
Old-age benefit calculation rules  
Base year population by age and gender   35
Current and projected fertility and mortality by age and gender.  Fertility assumption is 
almost immaterial, since it influences the results extremely little.  We have chosen to include 
it in the list of required variables only because it is readily available whenever mortality data 
is available. The assumption that some standard fertility path will be the same for all 
countries would work as well. 
Current stock of active nominal contributors.  Here we mean people who are earning 
pension rights in the base year, even though they might be exempt from contributions.  
Good examples are soldiers, clergy or mothers on maternity leave.  Nominal contributor 
numbers should exclude “dormant memberships,” that is, people who have contributed to 
the pension scheme for some time but are not active during the year for which IPD is being 
calculated. 
Current stock of beneficiaries by age, gender and type of benefit.    36
Data and Assumptions 
 
 Country  Data  Excludesa  Reforms  Length of service in new 
benefit estimation 
1 Argentina  2000    Ret. Age, benefit formula, multi-
pillar 
30/30; 10/10 for reduced 
pension 
2 Bolivia  2000    Multi-pillar 34/32 
3  Brazil  1998  State Civil servants 
(5%) 
Benefit formula, LOS requirements  35/30; 15 after 60/65 
4  Cape Verde  2001  Civil servants (7%)     29/26 
5 Chile  2001     multi-pillar  38/32 
6  Colombia  1999     Ret. Age, multi-pillar  28/22 
7 Costa  Rica  1993       28/22 
8 Croatia  1998 Croatia’s  defender’s 
scheme (1% ) 
Ret. Age, benefit formula  25/24 
9 Dominican 
Republic 
2000        27/27 
10 Ecuador  1998 Civil  servants     37/32 
11 El  Salvador  1997    Multi-pillar 33/25 
12 Estonia  1998    Ret. Age  32/29 
13  Hungary  1995  Reduced capacity to 
work program 
Ret. Age, multi-pillar  28/25 
14  Iran  2001        31/28 
15 Korea  1995 Military  personnel, 
private school 
teachers 
Ret. Age, benefit formula  33/20 
16 Kyrgyz  Rep.  1997    Ret. Age, notional accounts  29/20 
17 Lithuania  1998    Ret. Age, benefit formula  27/25 
18 Macedonia  1999    Ret. Age  23/23 
19 Malta  1998       39/30 
20  Mauritius  1998  Civil servants (10%)     31/28 
21  Mexico  1998  State civil servants  Multi-pillar  34/28 
22 Moldova  1997    Ret. Age, benefit formula  24/20 
23 Morocco  1997 Civil  servants     29/23 
24 Nicaragua  1998       31/26 
25 Peru  2000    Multi-pillar 35/32 
26 Philippines  1997       30/25 
27  Poland  1997  Armed forces  Ret. Age, notional accounts  Farm 30/25; urban 37/39 
28 Portugal  2000       36/32 
29 Romania  1996 Farmer’s  (11%)     25/25 
30 Senegal  1998       13/10 
31 Slovakia  1998       32/25 
32 Slovenia  1996 State  (citizen's) 
pension 
Ret. Age, benefit formula  27/25 
33 Turkey  1997    Ret. Age, decrease in disability 
pension, benefit formula, 
elimination of SYZ benefit 
BK - 25 for males; 20/25 & 
15 for females, ES - 25/25; 
SSK 23/23 
34 Ukraine  1998       35/30 
35 Uruguay  1995    Ret. Age, multi-pillar  30/30 
 Source: World Bank data base 
a coverage in parentheses. 
 Annex Table A: Estimated IPD for 35 Low and Middle Income Countries - detailed results 
 
Country  Coverage in  Dependency ratio Dependency ratio   IPD IPD IPD IPD IPD IPD 
  population aged 20+  in base year (a)  in year 2050 (a)  Index / Discount rate (b): wage/2% price/2% wage/4% price/4% wage/5% price/5%
                
Argentina  28  47  41    106  91 85 75 78 70 
Bolivia  18  16  24    111  92 73 65 62 55 
Brazil  34  28  62    500 362 330 248 275 211 
Cape  Verde  17  5  26    78 64 47 39 38 32 
Chile  35  13  42    77 64 60 50 53 45 
Colombia  22  5  56    88 73 56 48 46 39 
Costa  Rica  33  4  52    203 163 121 100  97  80 
Croatia  59  35  72    274 205 201 156 175 139 
Dominican  Rep.  20  7  44    80 64 49 40 40 32 
Ecuador  17  9  39    103  78 63 49 51 40 
El  Salvador  17  10  47    60 46 43 34 37 29 
Estonia  89  44  81    268 213 189 155 163 135 
Hungary  78  43  70    300 212 203 150 171 128 
Iran  26  11  56    146  110  89 70 72 57 
Korea  22  1  54    57 35 33 21 26 17 
Kyrgyz  Rep.  70  30  60    282 230 185 154 154 129 
Lithuania  78  50  84    221 164 155 120 134 104 
Macedonia  49  23  77    441 356 291 241 244 204 
Malta  57  18  58    356 284 234 190 194 159 
Mauritius  100  11  60    63 46 47 37 42 33 
México  25  7  40    101  84 65 54 54 45 
Moldova  73  63  68    229 178 159 127 136 111 
Morocco  6  10  53    50 40 32 26 26 22 
Nicaragua  21  6  33    220 173 131 105 104  84 
Peru  51  6  26    57 51 40 35 34 30 
Philippines 41  2  41    185  146  107  85  81  66 
Poland  95  24  47    379 304 261 212 220 181 
Portugal  78  36  72    358 271 233 181 193 151 
Romania  53  45  121    386 292 256 199 214 169 
Senegal  6  39  78    73 51 51 37 44 32 
Slovakia  81  37  91    304 241 210 171 179 148 
Slovenia  76  33  96    429 314 298 226 255 197 
Turkey  35  28  50    217 154 146 109 123  93 
Ukraine  91  42  82    365 292 257 211 220 183 
Uruguay  52  40  61    295 246 214 182 187 160 
 
Footenotes: 
(a) Ratio of old age pensioners to contributors 
(b) Indexation method applies both to the wage record valorization and to the indexation of pension benefit  
Source: World Bank Pension Database, and own calculations with PROST Model. 